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How Might Financial Market Information Be Used For
Supervisory Purposes? By J. Krainer & J.A.Lopez
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review 2003

A Review by Phebian.N.Omanukwue *

I.

Introduction

Banking services are extremely important, especially in a free market economy.
However, in s pite of banks catalytic role in the trans mission mechanism of monetary
policy, they arc exposed to a lot of risks, such as Liquidity, operational, market and
credit risks, among others. To guard agains t such risks, most economics have created
public safety nets as well as banking supervisory agencies and institu tions of various
forms to protect both the depositors and other banks/ s hareholders from systemic
shocks that could destabilize the system. In the conduct of its supervisory functions,
most central banks adopt an on-site and or an off-site monitoring system, utilizing
information such as assets quality and earnings, deposit liabilities, bank rating
models, and contingency frameworks to assess the soundness and s tability of the
banking system. However, it has become increasingly evident that a bank's condition
could deteriorate rapidly and where examjnation arc rather infrequent, the banking
supervision assessments could become outdated. This informed the work of Krainer
and Lopez in considering the use of financial market information for supervisory
purposes.
The paper, therefore, attempted to ascertain (adopting univariate event studies and
multivariate analysis), whether financial market claims, such as equity, bonds, debts,
uninsured deposits, etc, accur ately assesses banks conditions and how such
information might be used for supenisory purposes. Broad conclusions therefrom
were that implicit in the investment decisions of most financial investors were
performance evalu ation of the financial institutions. However, additional information
as r eflected in the financial market prices profers new and complementary
approaches to supervisory functions of monetary authorities.

•Phebiun is <111 Assist uni Economist in the Rese<irch and Sc<111s11cs Dep,mmenr o(che Cencml B,mk of Nigeria.
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II

Summary of the Paper

The authors noted that an empirical relationship between yields on banks
subordinated notes and debentures as meas ures of banks risks have been difficult to
establish. This was interpreted to be the result of the likelihood of investors'
perception of a real or implicit government guarantee of banks liabilities. With regards
to bank equities, however, mos t investors we re seen to incorporate risk related
information into banks s tock prices such that the s tock prices of a b ank or bank
holding company (BHC) reflects how exposed it is to default borrowers. For instance,
when the s tock price of a bank fall s s ignifi cantl y, the more exposed they are to default
borrowers and vice versa.
Further analysis revealed that assets opacity was not a prominent feature o f BHCs
traded on the ew York s tock exchange, ( YSE), American s tock exchange, (AMEX) as
well as the NASDAQ. This contrasted with another s tudy that s tated that asset opacity
might b e a prominent feature of BHCs given the differences on debt ratings of su ch
financial intermediaries that were likely to emerge from credit rating agencies. Such
differences in findings h ave been attributed to differing incentives facing investors,
rating agencies or perhaps different m ethodologies. In mos t cases, the use of financial
market data differs for inves tors, credit agencies as well as the supervisory bodies.
evertheless, there seems to be an alignment between the investors' assessm ents of
the financial market and the s upervisory agencies, as most investors view the rating by
the supervisory agency as a certification of the real financial condition of the bank.
In a ssessing the usefulness of financial markets information to s upervisory agencies,
studies conducted between 1998 and 2001, showed that equity and debt m arket
variables provided useful insight that supplemented supervisory assessm ents. On the
usefulness of debt market information for supervisory purposes, it was found tha t
debt spreads explained supervis ory ratings more than other capital ratios. In more
recent s tudies, examining the relationship between equity and debt prices and bank
ratings, it was revealed tha t equity market variables do not s ignal changes in the
ratings of banks, especially when such banks were closer to default. In Asia, stock
market prices were more respons ive to changing finan cial conditions than credit
ra tings of banks. Applying US data, it was shown that there was little Granger-causality
between equity market assessments and supervisory ratings. Further analysis also
revealed that s upervis ory agencies' rating d o not s ignal ch anging financial conditions
or changes in non-performing loan s. In summary, broad conclus ions from the
liter ature was that mos t finan cial market investors evaluate the per formance of the
banks and the information they seek were quite differ ent fro m that s ought by
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supervisory authorities, but, however, complements the supervisory roles of the
monetary authorities.
Utilizing models that forecasted the CAMELS/BOPEC ratings, financial market
information and the BHCs performance quarterly report, the authors conducted two
event studies (a univariate event study which consisted of an equity market event
study and a debt market study) and a multivariate analysis using the BOPEC off-site
monitoring model (BOM). The multivariate analysis ensures that the marginal value of
financial market data relative to supervisory data and the impact of variations in
financial market variables are examined across all BHCs on BOPEC ratings, whereas the
univariate event study is BHC specific on BOPEC ratings. In analyzing the hypothesis
whether financial market data detect changes in banks risk under the equity market
event study, the authors assume that changes in banks' conditions and investors'
perceptions of the future outlook of the firm's profitability induce changes in prices of
securities and BOPEC ratings. This assumption was made on the premise that BOPEC
ratings were classified and not for public consumption. Other assumptions were that
stock returns follow a 2-factor model, where the factors were the Federal funds rate
and the returns on market portfolio.
The essence of conducting a debt market event study was borne out of the need to
determine if changes in banks bond yields anticipate changes in supervisory BOPEC
ratings. Their findings from the event studies were that, on the average changes in
stock returns and subordinated debt spreads reflect supervisory ratings and are
consistent with it. Thus, it was concluded that the financial market data send signals of
about nine to twelve months prior to the supervisory authorities' assessments.
In assessing if the financial market variables actually tell supervisors what they do not
already know, a multivariate analysis (under a core and an extended framework) was
conducted using a BOPEC off-site monitoring model in which supervisory BOPEC
ratings were modeled in an ordered logit framework as a linear function of both
supervisory and financial market variables. Different measures such as (non-accrual
loans, ratio of leases to loans, returns on average assets, etc) used to capture the
supervisory concerns as embedded in the BOPEC were identified and estimated. Their
findings from the in-sample estimate of the core model, (which included only
supervisory variables) revealed that key supervisory variables (B, E and C components

' CAMELS is an <1cronym char scands (or banks rnpiral ade11uacy, asset <1ua/ity, managemenc, earnings, liquidity
and sensitivity to risks. BOPEC stands (or Bank subsidiaries, other non-bank subsidiaries, parenc comp<1ny,
earnings and capital adequacy. They are both supervisory ratings assigned a(cer bank examinations co
ascertain Che overall healrh and financial condition o(a bank/BHC
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of the BOPEC ratings) and the financial market variables were significant and
consis tent with apriori expectations in the extended model, which had both
supervisory variables and financial market data. The out-of-sample forecasts accuracy
from the core and extended BOM showed that the core and ext ended model forecasts a
BOPEC rating of 1 or 2 accurately about 80 percent and 75 percent of the time,
r espectively, but their accuracy dimjnishes at the lower rated banks/ BI-ICs. Comparing
the accuracy of the two set of forecasts from the models showed that there was little
statis tical difference b etween the two forecasts. However, using another metric to
gauge the contribution of financial market information in the model, it was shown that
the extended model produced 9 and 3 7 percent more correct signals over and above
that by the core model over a • -quarter and 1-quarter h orizon, respectively. The need
to be cau tious of errors of missed signals (type 1 errors) and forecasted ratings that do
not occur (type 2) were, however, rughlighted. Nevertheless, given the potentially large
costs of missed signals, it was advocated that supervisors use the extended BOM off
site monitoring model.

III Comments and Lessons for Nigeria
The paper h as shown that investors' view on the finan cial condition and prospects of
banks can be distilled from stock prices. This is because the equity market is fairly
liquid and its indices are quite sensitive to changes in the conilition of the issuing
institution, thus, making such changes, (reflected in the share price and earnings of
the Bank), easier to observe and anticipate. The article was quite apt and in-depth,
especially in the empirical analysis of the usefulness of stock market data and the
deductions therefrom, thereby providing answers to s pecific questions, such as the
appropriate level of accuracy to demand from financial market signals and off-site
monitoring models, as well as the possibility of financial markets to detect
changes/variations in banks' risk features. However, the findings from the study,
though necessary, were not sufficient enough to enable one conclude that bank
supervisors should b egin to rely on market signals. Indeed, bank supervisors must still
determine if and how market signals can be used, depending on th eir need for real
time, easy to interpret information and well laid down procedures already in practice.
Nevertheless, there are some emerging issues from this article which the monetary
authorities could use to improve on its supervisory functions. First, although the
depth of the igerian financial market has remained shallow in terms of instruments,
assets substitutability, etc, there are practical uses of stock market data, especially as a
complementary approach to existing supervisory fun ctions. One way of ensuring its
usefulness would b e by identifying clearly the information, which the stock market
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data can provide, Its relevance to the situation at hand and its limitations. It becomes
nl'cessary to note that the issue 1s not which source of supervisory information is more
accurate or important, but rather a complementary approach to supervisory
functions. The need for bank super\'isors to begin to look be} and the com cntional
data and its, ariations becomes more relevant in this age of bani-. consolidations.
The quest for reliability of returns and timeliness of disclosure by banks is a
continuous one. It may, thus, become necessary for the monetary authorilies to
consider using available stock market data to complement already existing
sun cillance methods, while still encouraging ban.ks for proper disclosure of their
operations. An approach to this would be to encourage the routine use of market data,
in the supervisory process, through monitoring of the stock prices of banks, etc, such
that if the stock prices nuctuatc irregularly, it could be noted as an exception, which
calls for closer monitoring during the surveillance process. This way, the supervisory
authorities become proactive. It becomes n ecessary to note at this juncture that
supervisory s taff should endeavor to ascertain if indeed prices set by investors vary in
consonance with the riskiness of the ban.ks before considering the use of market
prices. Second, it may be necessary to provide practical guidelines for supervisors who
do not have significant experience with market data to utilize them effectively as the
absence of such may lead to a misinterpretation of any fluctuation in market data.
Third, while much of the supervisory assessments rely on statistical techniques to
forecast future s upervisory ratings or bank failures, there remains the need to develop
an off-site monitoring model. This would provide an ideal method of determining, in
the Nigerian case, whether stock market data would provide additional
benefit/complementary information, not already in the existing e- FASS s upervisory
framework. Besides, this will provide incremental information between inspections,
beyond the traditional financial information, managerial reports and on site
inspections, more especially where the supervisory rating is outdated.
Furthermore, given the impact of the Central Bank's policy actions on the financial
market, such as on share prices of firms, lending and deposit rates, etc, and the steady
growth and ongoing reforms witnessed in the Nigerian stock market, there is need for
the monetary authorities to closely observe these financial market data (changes in
stock/share prices, spreads on debts and debentures, default probabilities, etc) with
the aim of incorporating it, at a future date, into the new risk-based banking
supervisory framework of the Central Bank.

